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Thomas E. Moseley*
"'When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather
scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose it to mean-neither
more nor less.' I, Cobbled together from past lectures and articles, this slim volume seeks in large measure to demonstrate that
the mode of constitutional analysis associated with Harvard Professor Laurence Tribe2 is not simply Humpty Dumpty harnessed
to the current liberal agenda. Moreover, the authors have also
embarked upon a critique of original intent jurisprudence, which
they upbraid for attempting to mask the "value-laden" choices
inherent in constitutional adjudication.' Indeed, this work appears to be something of an unsystematic rejoinder to former
federal judge Robert Bork who- in The Tempting of America 4 had
rather unkind things to say about Professor Tribe and his oeuvre.5
Furthermore, this extended essay also sounds the alarm over
provocative footnotes by Justice Scalia in his Michael H. v. Gerald6
* Partner, DeMaria, Ellis, Hunt, Salsberg & Friedman, Newark, N.J. A.B.,
Harvard College, 1969; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1972.
I LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND & THROUGH THE LOOKING GLAsS 186 (Signet ed. 1960).
2 Well known to both constitutional scholars and regular viewers of the McNeillLehrer News Hour, Professor Tribe may be justly recognized as a member of the
Harvard Law School faculty who owes his current celebrity to his ideas rather than
his clients.
3 LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 80

(1991).
4 Anthony K. Modafferi, III, Robert H. Bork's The Tempting of America: The Political

Seduction of the Law, 20 SETON HALL L. REV. 667 (1990)(reviewing ROBERT BORK,
THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990)).
5 Judge Bork observed in his survey of "The Theorists of Liberal Constitutional
Revisionism:"
Laurence Tribe's constitutional theory is difficult to describe, for it is
protean and takes whatever form is necessary at the moment to reach
a desired result. This characteristic, noted by many other commentators, would ordinarily disqualify him for serious consideration as a
constitutional theorist.
BORK, supra note 4, at 199.
6 491 U.S. 110 (1989). The incendiary footnotes injustice Scalia's opinion are
numbers 4 and 6. TRIBE, supra note 3, at 96, 106.
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opinion that are assertedly "tailor-made" 7 for use in overruling
Roe v. Wade8 and would "severely curtail the Supreme Court's
role in protecting individual liberties." 9 The authors also argue
repeatedly that the Supreme Court reached the wrong result in
Bowers v. Hardwick 1o largely because the majority opinion failed
to apply a generalized right "in the direction of intimate personal
association" that Professor Tribe had apparently advocated in his
role as counsel for the losing side. "
While Professors Tribe and Dorf whisk the reader through a
variety of constitutional issues, stopping along the way to seek
guidance from literature and mathematics, their attempts to craft
a mode of constitutional analysis that will sustain Roe, while rejecting Hardwick, must be adjudged a failure. The authors' failure is attributable to their silent partnership with Humpty
Dumpty and his methods. Nevertheless, this present statement
of Professor Tribe's constitutional views for lawyers and interested lay readers alike merits our attention, if only because the
changing winds of political fortune may bestow upon Professor
Tribe the honor that he worked so hard to deny Robert Bork.' 2
Although the authors begin their work by designating the jurisprudence of original intent as "How Not to Read the Constitution," they grudgingly admit the need for interpretive guidelines
in constitutional analysis:
The authority of the Constitution, its claim to obedience
and force that we permit it to exercise in our law and over our
lives, would lose all legitimacy if it really were only a mirror for
the readers' ideas and ideals. Just as the original intent of the
Framers-even if it could be captured in the laboratory, and
carefully inspected under a microscope-will not yield a satisfactory determinate interpretation of the Constitution, so too
at the other end of the spectrum we must also reject as completely unsatisfactory the idea of an empty or malleable
Constitution. 3
Thus, the authors would personally favor a constitutional right
7 TRIBE, supra note 3, at 107.
8 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
9 TRIBE, supra note 3, at 104.
10 478 U.S. 186 (1986). Bowers upheld Georgia's criminal prohibition against homosexual sodomy. Id.

I I TRIBE, supra note 3, at 117.

12 See ETHAN BRONNER, BATrLE FOR JUSTICE: How THE BORK NOMINATION SHOOK

AMERICA 127-30 (1989)(describing Professor Tribe's role in the campaign against

Judge Bork's nomination to the Supreme Court).
13 TRIBE, supra note 3, at 14.
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to "decent housing" as well as a ceiling on the amount of money
parents can leave their children, but "having read and reread the
document as it exists, and having thought hard about it, we both
agree that it is quite impossible to read our Constitution as including
either of these two provisions."' 4 Moreover, while recognizing the
limits of historical interpretation in constitutional analysis, the authors also urge that "it is indefensible to ignore [history]."'" Applicable to any mode of analysis, the authors warn prospective judges
against the two fallacious interpretive devices of "dis-integration"
and "hyper-integration."16
Having identified some wrong ways to read the Constitution,
the authors then seek to discern proper methods of constitutional
interpretation by analyzing those provisions that create what have
been called "unenumerated rights,"' 7 with principal reliance upon
the Ninth Amendment, 8 the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment' 9 and the Due Process Clause of that
same amendment.2 °
The authors undertake their analysis largely in the context of an
extended hypothetical involving how these provisions might be applied to an obnoxious local legislation. 2 1 The limiting principle that
14 Id. (emphasis in original).
15 Id. at 18. Similar protestations by Professor Tribe have been received with
abundant skepticism. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 4, at 200 (commenting that "these
claims are shown by the rest of [Tribe's] book to be patently untrue").
16 TRIBE, supra note 3, at 19-30. The authors define "dis-integration" as "approaching the Constitution in ways that ignore the salient fact that its parts are
linked into a whole-that it is a Constitution, and not merely an unconnected
bunch of separate clauses and provisions with separate histories." Id. at 20.
"Hyper-integration" presents a converse set of problems: "[A]pproaching the Constitution in ways that ignore the no less important fact that the whole contains distinct parts-parts that were added at ...separated points in American history...
parts that reflect distinct, and often radically incompatible premises." Id.
17 TRIBE, supra note 3, at 31-64 ("Structuring Constitutional Conversations").
18 The Ninth Amendment provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution of
certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people." U.S. CoNsT. amend. IX. The authors apparently do not claim that the
Ninth Amendment creates substantive rights. Rather, they state that it is "the only
rule of interpretation explicitly in the Constitution." TRIBE, supra note 3, at 54.
19 The Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1. The
authors concede, however, that the Privileges and Immunities Clause has been a
virtual "dead letter" since the Slaughterhouse Cases. TRIBE, supra note 3, at 52-53.
20 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that "nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
21 The imagined enactment is one that would require all families to eat together
once a month. TRIBE, supra note 3, at 45. Naturally, for theorists like Tribe, consti-
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they propose in this analysis is to "seek unenumerated rights by
drawing on other parts of the text, coupled with history."2 2 The
authors urge that this limiting principle would ostensibly make their
approach something other than "Humpty Dumpty enumerates the
unenumerated." Building upon the views of Norman Redlich,23 the
authors then summarize their position: "If we look at the First,
Third and Fourth Amendments, they suggest a tacit postulate with a
textual root-namely, that the consensual intimacies in the home
are presumptively protected as a privilege of United States
citizens." 2 4
Unfortunately, according to the authors, the Supreme Court
failed to carry over the level of generality implicit in such prior decisions as Griswold v. Connecticut 25 and Roe, into Bowers. In Bowers, and
later in Michael H., the court failed to apprehend the right at issue
with the appropriate level of generality. 26 Instead, the court evaluated the right by reference to the historical tradition most specifically associated with the exact conduct at issue, homosexual sodomy
in Bowers, and claims by natural fathers asserting rights to children
conceived in adulterous liaisons in Michael H. The proper test for
generality, the authors argue, was "whether the asserted level of
generality provides an appropriate reference to the newly asserted
rights." 2 7 Furthermore, the authors elaborate on this point as
follows:
[I]f one is willing to generalize much at all, the Constitution's
text-in the First Amendment's protection of peaceful assembly and in the special solicitude for the home in the Third
Amendment and the Fourth Amendment-points toward generalizing in the direction of intimate personal association in
the privacy of the home, rather than generalizing in the direction of, let us say, freedom of choice in matters of procreation.
tutional metal always seems to expand more easily when fired by the heat of some
egregious local legislation that no "right thinking" person would permit. See, e.g.,
BORK, supra note 4, at 234 (observing that "[t]he actual Constitution does not forbid every ghastly hypothetical law, and once you begin to invent doctrine that does,
you will create an unconfinable judicial power").
22 TRIBE, supra note 3, at 60. That Professor Tribe at least appears to speak the
language of original intent may suggest how far scholars such as Judge Bork and
others have succeeded in moving the terms of constitutional debate. Unfortunately, Professor Tribe's adoption of the originalist vocabulary is largely
camouflage.
23 Norman Redlich, Are There Certain Rights Retained by the People?, 37 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 787, 810-12 (1962).
24 TRIBE,

supra note 3, at 60.

25 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
26 TRIBE, supra note 3, at
27 Id. at 111.

97-117.
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It is for this reason that Hardwick seems to us so egregiously wrong; that Roe seems a closer and more difficult
8
case.

2

Despite these efforts, the authors do not appear to have solved
their Humpty Dumpty problem. In the first place, their assault upon
original intent jurisprudence, so lucidly and elegantly expounded by
Judge Bork in The Tempting of America, amounts to little more than an
intellectual Pickett's charge-a brief lodgement here, a small penetration there, but, in all, a failure.2 9 At one level, the authors appear
to understand original intent as simply an arrogant attempt to decide cases according to how the framers might have ruled if confronted with the issue. This caricature of original intent highlights
the familiar truth that the framers' unenacted intentions are not
law. 3 0 Yet, this misapprehends Judge Bork's position:
In short, all that a Judge committed to original understanding
requires is that the text, structure, and history of the Constitution provide him not with a conclusion but a major premise.
That major premise is a principle or stated value that the ratifiers wanted to protect against hostile legislation or executive
action. The judge[sic] must then see whether that principle or
value is threatened by the statute or action challenged in the
case before him. The answer to that question provides his minor premise, and the conclusion follows. It does not follow
without difficulty, and two judges equally devoted to the original purpose may disagree about the reach or application of the
principle at stake and so arrive at different results, but that in
no way distinguishes that task from the difficulties of applying
any other legal writing.
This version of original understanding certainly does not
mean that judges will invariably decide cases the way the men
of the ratifying conventions would if they could be resurrected
to sit as courts. Indeed, the various ratifying conventions
would surely have split within themselves and with one another in the application of the principles they adopted to particular fact situations. That tells us nothing other than that the
ratifiers were like other legislators. Any modem congressional
majority would divide over particular applications of a statute
28 Id. at 117.
29 JAMES M. MCPHERSON, THE BATrLE CRY OF FREEDOM 662 (1988).
30 TRIBE, supra note 3, at 10-12, 80, 106. Professor Tribe's treatment

of judge

Bork's views should perhaps give us pause as we survey intellectual controversies
from vanished eras where only one side has come down to us. See, e.g., ROBERT L.
WILKEN, THE CHRISTIANS As THE ROMANS SAW THEM (1984)(attempting to recreate
the views of the pagan critics of Christianity from the surviving Christian works
written to refute these critics).
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its members had just enacted. That does not destroy the value
of seeking the best understanding of the principle enacted in
the case either of the statute or of the Constitution.
We must not expect too much of the search for original
understanding in any legal context. The result of the search is
never perfection; it is simply the best we can do; and the best
we can do must be regarded as good enough-or we must
abandon the enterprise of law and, most especially, that ofjudicial review. Many cases will be decided as the lawgivers
would have decided them, and, at the very least, judges will
confine themselves to the principles the lawgivers intended.
The precise congruence of individual decisions with what the
ratifiers intended can never be known, but it can be estimated
whether, across a body of decision, judges have in general indicated the principle given into their hands. If they accomplish that, they have accomplished something of great value.A
In their misunderstanding of original intent, the authors also
seem to have difficulty with the first step in the jurisprudence of
original intent, namely the text itself. For example, they take Judge
Posner to task for apparently attempting "to read in the Constitution as it exists a sweeping ban on race-specific affirmative action,
even though the text says absolutely nothing, and, so far as we can
determine, the history does not support, requiring government to
'2
be color-blind when it seeks to eradicate historic discrimination. '
Yet the authors' apparent belief that the Constitution is silent on
eliminating racial discrimination by discriminating on the basis of
race overlooks the plain language of the Equal Protection Clause. 33
Judge Bork explains the function of the Equal Protection Clause:
"the Judge should state the principle at the level of generality that
the text and historical evidence warrant. The equal protection
clause was adopted in order to protect the freed slaves, but its language, being general applies to all persons." 3 4
In this same vein, the authors further misapprehend Judge
Bork's position on original intent by arguing that "it would require
31 BORK,

supra note 4, at 162-63.

supra note 3, at 16.
The Equal Protection Clause provides, "nor shall any State ... deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1. Indeed, as one wit observed at the time, the proper response to a
different result in Regents of University of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), would
have been a constitutional amendment reenacting the original Equal Protection
Clause with the added language, "This time we mean it."
34 BORK, supra note 4, at 149. Professors Tribe and Dorf note, however, the flaw
in Bork's statement.
32 TRIBE,
33
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virtually no claim of constitutional right ever be upheld,"3 5 citing the
example of how Judge Bork might resolve a claim to the violation of
speedy trial rights under the Sixth Amendment.3 6 Yet their contention that drawing any line in such a decision is no "less subjective
than the judgment that the right to have sex without children is part
of the 'liberty' protected by the Fourteenth Amendment" is surely
nonsense.3 7 UnderJudge Bork's analysis, a decision would proceed
from a constitutional value expressly articulated in the text of that
document and informed by available historical materials. Furthermore, that major premise in constitutional adjudication would have
been adopted through the democratic process for amending the
Constitution, a process that would have given the people's representatives the choice to select or reject this value. By contrast, Professor Tribe's analysis would, like Humpty Dumpty, simply read
"liberty" to mean the constitutional right to have sex without children and thus create a new constitutional value not recognized,
much less discussed, in the ratification process.
The authors' dissatisfaction with original intent leads them to
take strong exception with Judge Bork on the issue of unenumerated rights, which may be seen as perhaps the most basic disagreement between Professor Tribe and Judge Bork. With respect to the
Due Process Clause, Professor Tribe does not seriously address
much less seek to refute the powerful arguments made by Judge
Bork and others3 8 that the Due Process Clauses in both the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments were simply not intended to create substantive rights, despite a history of erroneous judicial interpretation
that began with Chief Justice Taney's decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford.3 9 While the authors also place some stock in the Privilege and
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and appear to be
on firmer ground in criticizing Judge Bork for apparently wanting to
treat this provision as a constitutional dead letter, they undertake no
serious analysis of the historical evidence 40 and are content to ob35 TRIBE, supra note 3, at 67 (emphasis added).
36 Id. More specifically, the authors suggest that if Judge Bork were to rule a

three year delay in trying a criminal defendant violated the speedy trial provision of
the Sixth Amendment, Judge Bork would be "guilty" of making a subjective determination in interpreting the Constitution. Id.
37 Id.

38 BORK, supra note 4, at 32.
39 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857)(gratuitously invalidating the Missouri Compro-

mise as an infringement on slaveholders' property rights in their human chattels).
40 That evidence, even broadly read, would not support Roe or compel a different result in Hardwick. RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BYJUDICIARY 20-51 (1977). See
BORK, supra note 4, at 180-81.
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serve in pedestrian fashion that "protecting your ability to control
your own body would have to be on anyone's short list of basic liberties or privileges and immunities in our system of government. ' ' 4 1
In contrast, the impressive historical evidence in Hardwick suggests
that using your body for homosexual sodomy was not on this list
when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, and Justice Rehnquist's forceful dissent in Roe makes the same point on abortion.
Apart from these provisions, however, the Ninth Amendment
appears to be the authors' chosen favorites. 42 Again, the authors
simply do not answer the strong case made by Judge Bork and
others that the Ninth Amendment was intended to prevent -the Constitution from encroaching on rights created by state law, a view that
would surely eliminate the Ninth Amendment as a source of federal
rights against state legislation.4" Instead, Tribe and Dorf assert the
following claim:
By contrast, nothing in the Constitution's test remotely forecloses the argument that unconventional sexual behavior is a
fundamental right. If we are to take seriously the Ninth
Amendment's requirement that "[t]he enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny
or disparage others retained by the people," at a minimum we
must consider the possibility that rights which are consistent
with the enumerated rights-as a right to choose unconventional sexual behavior is, and as a "right" to engage in theft
surely is not-may be required by the Constitution.4 4
Furthermore, the limiting and supporting principles that the
authors apparently espouse to keep the Ninth Amendment from becoming a toy for Humpty Dumpty border on the absurd and invite
derision, as if the Third Amendment's 4 5 prohibition against the
quartering of troops, which addresses one very specific historical
evil, somehow provides a constitutional warrant for homosexual
sodomy or abortion. In part, the authors have cited these other provisions of the Constitution as limiting principles in rejoinder to
Judge Bork's provocative argument that Professor Tribe's manipulation of "liberty" would be equally conducive to sustaining kleptomania as homosexuality. 46 According to Tribe and Dorf, however,
41

TRIBE,

supra note 3, at 61. See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 176-77 (1973).

42 TRIBE, supra note 3, at 110-11.
43 BORK, supra note 4, at 183-85.
44 TRIBE, supra note 3, at 110.

45 The Third Amendment provides: "No soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war, but in a
manner to be prescribed by law." U.S. CoNsT. amend. III.
46 BORK, supra note 4, at 204. Far from fatuous, as Tribe and Dorf contend,
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those provisions that repeatedly deal with property would foreclose
such a conclusion, although the ones dealing with life apparently do
not foreclose abortion as a fundamental liberty.
Turning from this analysis to Professor Tribe's treatment of Roe
v. Wade, we should first note that we have come a long way from the
authors' adjuration not to ignore history. After all, the Civil War
amendments, which provide for Roe's supposed constitutional
framework, were the product of a bitter struggle that was hardly
over the supposed right to throttle unborn children in the womb.
Instead, in a very real sense, the Civil War, certainly after the Emancipation Proclamation, became an armed struggle to overrule Dred
Scott, which had placed a part of humanity beyond constitutional
protection. Yet, like Dred Scott, Roe also places beyond the constitutional pale what many passionately believe,- with good- reason, to be
part of a humanity equally deserving of protection.
Here the authors point out, with expressed reservation:
It is quite clear, of course, that the Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment did not think of fetuses as persons, entitled to
special protection. Indeed, the amendment includes in its definition of "citizens" "[a]ll persons born in the United States."
But so what? The State can surely take note of the fact that
fetuses soon will be "citizens," and that some persons think of
them as already entitled to the protections of personhood so
why cannot a state act on that perception, however controversial it may be?4 7
At the simplest level, of course, the citizenship provision of the
Fourteenth Amendment overrules Dred Scott's specific holding that
blacks cannot be citizens and says nothing about who are "persons"
under the amendment, a category that includes more than just citizens.4" Yet they themselves are not persuaded on this point and,
Judge Bork's example is not refuted by their analysis because the property provisions foreclose state action to take away property and are silent on what some future advocate might argue is the transcendent liberty to assert control over your
own body by taking your neighbor's purse. Moreover, the authors' emphasis on
controlling your own body and intimacies in the home would seem to give constitutional protection to the transaction involved in the home delivery service provided
by modern Polly Adlers.
47 TRIBE, supra note 3, at 61 (emphasis added). In the end, as the authors would
probably concede, Roe has ended the controversy over abortion about as much as
Dred Scott resolved the issue of slavery in the territories.
48 See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (positing that aliens are
protected as "persons" under Fourteenth Amendment). Indeed, if one wishes to
play the authors' game with language, the amendment may be said, at least impliedly, to define "person" broadly enough to include the unborn because, in defining citizen, the drafters limited the definition to persons who were born.
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instead, seek to defend Roe on equal protection grounds because of
the "unique" imposition on women. 49 Indeed, in a work that ostensibly faults the Supreme Court for defining rights too narrowly, they
criticize Roe for not limiting its holding to the apparent fact that the
pregnancy in that case was the product of a gang rape, leaving for
"another day the difficult problem of line-drawing among degrees
and sources of involuntariness. "50 The essay, however, does not develop the equal protection argument, although Professor Tribe has
dealt extensively with abortion in a separate book.5 '
Yet, any argument that would allow consideration of the state
interests that Roe banned by fiat remains anathema to the authors.5 2
Leaving abortion to the states, they argue, would have to be done
on the basis of a constitutional analysis that would also give to the
states the power to compel abortions, as in the People's Republic of
China.53 While common sense might possibly suggest that the odds
are highly unlikely our society will shortly move in step with the
PRC, sustaining Roe v. Wade is hardly necessary to recognize that
compulsory abortions would invoke both the Due Process Clause
and the Eighth Amendment.5 4 In short, Roe is not our last, best
hope against modern Maoism.
Related to the authors' analysis of Roe is their concern that Justice Scalia's formulation in footnote 6 of the Michael H. case would
somehow eviscerate all constitutional protections granted by the
Due Process Clause by building the state interest into the "liberty"
55
sought to be protected:
49 TRIBE,

supra note 3, at 63.

50 Id. at 63.
51 LAURENCE TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES (1990). The authors'
arguments about evolving constitutional protection for intimate actions at home
would seem to offer rather weak support for Roe unless the friendly neighborhood
abortionist makes house calls. Moreover, even the authors stop short of contending that one's asserted First Amendment right against receiving information extends to being forced to hear a baby's cry, while the Third Amendment prohibition
on quartering troops is not invoked.
52 TRIBE, supra note 3, at 62-63.
53 TRIBE, supra note 3, at 62. Such an inflated argument really says that "only
Humpty Dumpty to save us from the Jabberwocky" and appears as a frequent justification for the Humpty Dumpty approach to constitutional interpretations.
54 Certainly a legislative enactment imposing a death sentence upon the innocent unborn child would be a matter of some serious concern even under what
Professor Tribe might regard as Judge Bork's too narrow view of the Due Process
Clause, and the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
55 This footnote reads as follows:
We cannot imagine what compels this strange procedure of looking at
that which is assertedly the subject of a liberty interest in isolation
from its effect upon other people rather like inquiring whether there
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This is so because, unless the state's interest is absurd on its
face, when it is suitably incorporated into an asserted liberty it
will render that liberty so specific as to seem insupportable, or
at least radically disconnected from precedent. The privacy
right protected in Roe becomes the implausible "right" to destroy a living fetus; the free speech right protected in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan becomes the dubious "right" to libel a
public official; the right to an exclusionary remedy for Fourteenth Amendment violations protected in Mapp v. Ohio becomes the counter intuitive "right" of a criminal to suppress
the truth. To state 56
these cases this way is to decide them in
government's favor.
Yet again, such hyperbole proves far too much. Both the First
and the Fourth Amendments, textually and historically, embody explicit values in free speech and limitations upon search and seizure
without a warrant that, under a jurisprudence of original intent,
would be enforced. They stand in marked contrast to "liberty" as a
substantive value into which prior court majorities have poured
both Lochner5 7 and Roe. To recognize that the states may find there
is no Fourteenth Amendment "liberty" to harm another, even
someone en ventre sa mere, will hardly jettison the First or Fourth
Amendments.
Finally, the authors take the Court severely to task for failing to
sufficiently generalize the constitutional rights at issue in Hardwick
and Michael H.5 8 In one sense, this stands in marked contrast to
their criticism of Roe, for not avoiding "the rush to sweeping, global,
across-the-board solutions." 5 9 At the same time, they would seem
to be on firm ground in recognizing the difficulties in using tradition
as a limiting factor, especially because this may merely enshrine a
tradition of intolerance.6" Yet, their entire argument underscores
the profound difficulties that emerge when the Due Process Clause
is used to create substantive rights. As Judge Bork trenchantly observed, commenting on Michael H.:
However one feels about that, the balance between the interis a liberty interest in firing a gun where the case at hand happens to
involve its discharge into another person's body.
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 146 n.4 (1989).
56 TRIBE, supra note 3, at 107 (citations omitted).
57 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
58 TRIBE, supra note 3, at 95-117.
59 TRIBE, supra note 3, at 63.
60 In the words of author Gary Willis, quoted by Judge Bork, "Running men out
of town on a rail is at least as much an American tradition as declaring inalienable
rights."

BORK,

supra note 4, at 235.

1992]

BOOK REVIEW

1119

ests of the natural father and the marital family is surely a
moral and prudential issue for the people and not for the unguided discretion of judges.
It may be that [Justice] Scalia and [ChiefJustice] Rehnquist are
trying to come as close as they can to that position by insisting
on using the most specific tradition available. But even that
assumes an illegitimate power, and the limitations will prove
no restriction at all when there is only a general unfocused
tradition to be found.6 1
While this work deserves strong criticism, the authors' essay is
certainly a useful addition to our continuing constitutional debate.
Indeed, both this work and The Tempting of America could be profitably assigned as texts for any advanced seminar on constitutional law.
Moreover, the true test of any idea, as Justice Holmes has written, is
combat. Fate may yet place Laurence Tribe in the Senate arena to
defend his constitutional jurisprudence under the new rules of engagement for Supreme Court nominees, rules that he himself did so
much to create. If this book is any indication, he will need more
than the king's horses and men to sustain many of his views as an
acceptable approach to interpreting the Constitution.
61 BORK,

supra note 4, at 240.

